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ABSTRACT
The concept of a cool head and a warm heart co-existing is a Buddhist principle which
attempts to illustrate compassion and pragmatism as mutually compatible, not mutually
exclusive. Without intelligent management, compassion is lost in its ineffectiveness, and
without compassion, intelligence is purposeless reason. This equilibrium is exactly the vision
of microfinance that drives this paper: an important social and moral idea that is nevertheless
affected by the world and environment in which it operates. By examining the governance
mechanisms affecting microfinance in Cameroon, namely the Ministry of Finance and the
management structure of the firms themselves, an idea emerges of constructive actions to take
to allow this industry to flourish in an environment that isn’t always conducive to
accomplishing the industry goals. With an end objective of identifying proactive steps to be
taken by the state and by individual microfinance firms, this paper examines the relationship
between microfinance and governance generally, and uses the specific example of the MC2
micro-bank network overseen by the Appropriate Development for Africa Foundation
(ADAF, who also embraces the idea of a heart in their logo and motto). Ultimately, by
understanding the cool head of governance, the warm heart of microfinance’s social mission
will be allowed to takes its proper place.
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INTRODUCTION
I: Context
Cameroon, situated in West-Central Africa, has a population of 18.2 million,
approximately 7.3 million of whom live below the national poverty line1. However, when
examining the rural population of 8.1 million, it is found that approximately 4 million are
defined as living in poverty, or a full 50% of the rural population, versus 41% of the total
population2. Cameroon’s GDP per capita is 2,300 USD, ranking 178th in the world, and its
GDP growth rate is 3.3%, 115th in the world3; but, taking population growth into account, the
GDP per capita growth rate is much lower, at 1.6%4, a statistic that is a much more accurate
reflection of quality of life. GDP is heavily driven by agriculture which comprises 43.6% of
GDP and 70% of labor-force employment5. Unfortunately, the access to financial services for
those living in rural areas and hence those involved in agriculture is severely limited,
especially to the 4 million rural poor. To fill this supply gap, over 500 microfinance firms
have come into being in Cameroon between 1990 and 2009 who are attempting to give the
poor and very poor access to savings, loans, and other financial services.

II: Problem Statement
With so many people depending solely on these independent institutions for financial
services and an increasingly large portion of the formal and informal Cameroonian economy
driven by these non-governmental entities, the state began to regulate the industry in 1992 and
is still today refining its approach. The microfinance institutions themselves are faced with a
continually-growing market, exponentially increasing interest in the sector with its publicized

1

“Cameroon”. CIA World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook. 2009.
“Cameroon Statistitcs”. Rural Poverty Portal. www.ruralpovertyportal.org. 2006.
3
CIA World Factbook.
4
Rural Poverty Portal.
5
CIA World Factbook.
2
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successes, and an increased potential for demand as the population grows6. How, therefore,
should the state and microfinance institutions manage the current micro-credit sector while
building capacity for greater services in the future to fulfill the goals of alleviating poverty
and empowering the poor?
To understand the role governance of the state and of the microfinance institutions has
in the future of the micro-credit industry is to understand how the state and the institutions
interact, and the management structure of microfinance firms. Governance has emerged as
the key word in the study of efficacy7 and has been proposed as a solution to many of the
current problems facing the industry, and also as the key to increasing the depth and breadth
of the micro-credit sector. Governance of the state affects the microfinance firms and the
environment in which they operate, and governance of the firms themselves directly affects
the definition of their objectives and their ability to achieve their goals8. By understanding
the governance of the state and of the firms themselves, it is possible to define the key to
increasing efficacy in the present and unlocking a world of potential for the future.

III: Objectives
The main objective of this work it to understand the effect state governance and the
management organization of the institutions themselves has on microfinance performance in
Cameroon. Specifically, this means examining:
•

State regulations and their implications in microfinance creation and performance;

•

Organization of microfinance firms, specifically MC2 microbanks, and the effect
on the achievement of the social and economic missions;

•

Perceptions of the state by microfinance firms, and perceptions of microfinance
firms by the state;

6

Triodos Facet/MicroNed. “Trends in Microfinance 2010-2015”. www.triodosfacet.nl. May 2009.
Demanou, Patrick. « Séminaire annuel : Les institutions du modèle MC2 échangent sur la gouvernance, la rentabilité, le
portefeuille crédit ». Le défi des pauvres : Modèle MC2: Une approche endogène de développement. Vol 13 : November
2008. (13)
8
Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005.

7
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•

Governance effects on the future of the microfinance sector.

IV: Hypotheses
From the above objectives, it is possible to draw the following hypotheses.
1. The government has a strong influence on the operations of the microfinance institutions,
and, through this influence, has the opportunity to greatly affect the efficacy and future
potential of the sector.
2. There is much room for improvement in the management of the microfinance industries
themselves to increase their capacity.

V: Methodology
The investigation of these hypotheses was conducted through a combination of work
in conjunction with the Appropriate Development for Africa Foundation (ADAF) in Yaoundé,
Cameroon, and a series of interviews with microfinance practitioners, government officials,
and ADAF partner organizations. ADAF is a non-governmental organization that, among
other development efforts, assists with the management of two micro-credit institutions
(MUFFA and MC2). It is the case of the MC2 micro-banks that was used as an example of the
micro-credit industry. The original goal was to be an active participant in the organization,
but unfortunately there was little work available, so the primary method of data collection
became interviews and primary literature. Also, no access was given to international contacts
or partner organizations because it was stated that “ADAF could answer all questions”.
Therefore, in an effort to gain a broad-reaching understanding in a limited amount of time,
interviews were conducted across sectors. High-level managers at ADAF were interviewed
on the internal structure of both ADAF and the micro-banks, the role of the state as they
perceived it, and opportunities for both the state and the micro-banks to improve their
efficacy. Officials at the Ministry of Finance were also asked how the state and the
microfinance industry can change to best advance, and were additionally questioned on the
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regulations governing microfinance, the general perception of microfinance by the state, and
how effective microfinance is as a force in the macro economy. ADAF partner organizations,
such as the Peace Corps and Afriland First Bank provided not only details on their specific
projects with ADAF but an outside perspective on the management structures of ADAF and
the MC2s and how that affected their ability to carry out their economic and social missions.
Occasionally, among practitioners, it was difficult to solicit genuine responses to opinion
questions, particularly when there was a ‘line’ or a given phrase that was easily substituted
(e.g. a mission statement used to answer an efficiency question). However, these given
phrases and other supplementary literature allowed primary analysis of the policy and
management environments, including the Banking Commission for Central African States
regulations on microfinance institutions and the official mission statements of ADAF and
MC2s.

VI: Plan
The plan of our work will be as follows:
•

Chapter One: Microfinance and Governance

•

Chapter Two: Microfinance Market in Cameroon

•

Chapter 3: Influence of State Actions and Regulations on Microfinance Firms

•

Chapter 4: Effect of Structure and Organization of Microfinance Firms on their
Performance.
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CHAPTER 1: MICROFINANCE AND GOVERNANCE

I: Definitions
The definition of microfinance as laid out by the Banking Commission for Central
African States is: “an activity carried out by registered entities which do not have the status
of banks or financial institution…and which carry out, on a regular basis, loans operations
and/or savings collection and offer specific financial services to populations who mainly
operate outside to [sic] traditional banking channel [sic]”9. As is referenced in this definition,
it is important to expand the understanding of microfinance to include all financial services,
most importantly saving, and that services are not limited to small scale loans.
For the purposes of this work, state governance will be understood as the laws and
regulations governing microfinance created or adopted by the Ministry of Finance. Also
included are actions taken by the state that directly or indirectly affect the economic or social
environment in which microfinance operates. Microfinance governance will be understood as
the organization of the management structure of microfinance firms, the adopted regulations
outside of those created by the state, the actual lending practices, and the general
comportment of the staff at these institutions. These definitions serve to clarify the scope of
the investigation of this work and limit the broad term ‘governance’ to specific actions taken
by the state and the microfinance institutions.

II: State Governance Concerns Development Generally
Governance is a concern to development and international aid strategies in general,
particularly the problem of corruption within a local, regional, or federal government.

9

Banking Commission for Central African States. “CEMAC Regulation Relating to the Conditions Governing
the Exercise and the Control of Microfinance Activities”. Texts Relating to the Exercise of Microfinance
Activities. Adopted 26 January 2002. (Part I, Article 1)
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Frankly, “a fundamental truth [is]… development depends on good governance…No country
is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves, or police can
be bought off by drug traffickers. No business wants to invest in a place where the
government skims 20% off the top, or the head of the port authority is corrupt”10. Corruption
limits investment and takes profits away from participating individuals, undermining one of
the principle tenants of free-market economics. Other issues with governance include “low
levels of transparency and accountability, and an absence of effective development
strategies”, all of which “add up to a government not conducive to effective aid”11. Not only
does aid perform worse, but aid is less available to those governments with such practices.
The United States, for example, under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, has had aid
conditional on good governance, Bush through his Millennium Challenge Accounts12 and
Obama with his declaration in Ghana that America will “increase assistance for responsible
individuals and institutions, with a focus on supporting good governance” and “support those
who act responsibly and to isolate those who don’t”13. Additionally, unsound governance
practices such as financial misregulation can contribute to financial crises, all of which affect
the poor much more than the rich. Financial regulation and sound economic policy are
essential to assuring stable fiscal environments for development efforts and international aid
to be successful.

III: State Governance Concerns Micro-credit Specifically
Arguments have been made that, to some or a large extent, microfinance is
independent from regulatory entities, which frees them from concerns of corruption, lack of
enforcement, or little legal support. Micro-credit “can thrive in weak legal and other formal
10

Associated Press. “Text of President Obama’s Speech in Ghana”. 2009.
UNESCO. “Overcoming inequality: why governance matters”. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2009. UNESCO Press:
Paris, France. 2008. (219)
12
Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005.
13
Obama’s Speech in Ghana
11

11

institutional environments because they [micro-credit institutions] largely do not have to rely
on such formal institutions to operate…Many of the risk-mitigation techniques developed by
microfinance institutions…are functional substitutes for legal-institution-intensive forms of
creditor protection”14. Joint liability is one such technique: it relies on community members
to act as social collateral for fellow borrows, meaning, instead of pledging financial assets,
clients have friends or co-workers guarantee a portion of the loan. Because the community
knows the borrowers, only reliable individuals are guaranteed and, because there is a sense of
loyalty to that community and its members, there are social consequences to defaulting on a
loan15. Joint liability theoretically eliminates the need for an effective enforcement network
or a well-developed system of credit regulation; instead, community members perform these
offices and there is no formal institutional involvement. As a result, “microfinance might be
an important financial development strategy in the face of weak, incompetent, or corrupt
governance, and in post-conflict reconstruction efforts…”16 because it allows development
efforts to be made without tacitly or explicitly supporting malgovernance. In fact,
microfinance may be able to contribute to the development of better governance by helping
“foster internal demand for political changes regarding financial repression, including easing
interest rate controls, permitting greater foreign ownership of financial firms, and ending
directed lending to cronies that hamper financial development…” The “entrenched elites who
benefit from the current system have little incentive to promote these changes even though
financial development would benefit the country broadly”17. By involving more people in the
financial system and thereby providing personal, popular motivation for reform, micro-credit
firms hold the government responsible for good regulation policy, especially considering
microfinance clients have the potential to vastly outnumber the elites.
14

Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005. (284)
15
Hubka, Ashley and Rida Zaidi. “Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance.” Prepared for the World
Development Report 2005: Improving the Investment Climate for Growth and Poverty Reduction. (3)
16
Barr. (284-5)
17
Barr (291)
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However, the argument that microfinance is completely separate from government
influence eventually fails, particularly as efforts are made to expand the sector to a broader
client base and a deeper lending pool. At a basic level, it is true that, while microfinance can
perform independently of formal regulatory institutions, “microfinance institutions operating
in bad legal and policy environments are likely to fare much worse than their counterparts
elsewhere…”18. In order to have a successful micro-credit sector as a whole, the government
is a necessary implementer of social, economic, and financial policy.
Micro enterprises run by poor people cannot be broadly successful simply because they
have increased opportunities to borrow money. For large numbers of micro enterprises to be
successful, they also need access to decent roads and affordable means of moving their
products to markets. They need a vibrant, well-functioning domestic market itself that
encompasses enough people with enough money to buy what these enterprises have to sell.
Finally, micro businesses benefit greatly from an expanding supply of decent wage-paying
jobs in their local economies. This is the single best way of maintaining a vibrant domestic
market19.

Development is more than investing money and developing human capital. There must be
structures in place, physically and economically, for development to be sustained and for the
population to be able to take advantage of the new opportunities. Economically, for example,
the government is responsible for general macroeconomic health, and “macroeconomic
instability can wreak havoc with microfinance programs… [malgovernance] can make
microfinance unprofitable and unsustainable”20. The government’s ability to control the
economy and even the availability of information on that economy means it controls the
environment in which the microfinance institution operates. If, for example, there is extreme
hyperinflation and currency value is rocketing up, no one will take out a loan because it two
days the amount will be worthless. Also, consider the price of certain goods in the market: if
a farmer cannot sell her goods a profit-making price because the unstable market will not
support it, she will not be able to pay back her loan. If an entrepreneur cannot attract

18

Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005. (285).
19
Pollin, Robert. “Microcredit: False Hopes and Real Possibilities” www.fpif.org. 21 June 2007.
20
Barr. (284-5).
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investors because the government does not support a good-investment environment, the
economy loses.
Even if a country is economically and socially healthy, financial governance has a
huge effect on microfinance. Firstly, financial crises caused by faulty governance affect the
poor, the target market of microfinance, more than the rich because the poor have little to no
savings and live financially moment to moment, whereas the rich have accrued assets or
wealth in other forms that cushion the impact of crises. But, even in the absence of a crisis,
the wealthy are still in a better position, because they can “rely on relationships and ample
assets in the face of information-poor and legally weak markets”21. These connections and
assets are made in the corrupt environment of poor state governance which perpetuates a
static economic reality as opposed to mobile economic potential, one of the goals of microcredit. Those who participate in corrupt business practices benefit and stay rich, whereas
those who cannot or will not participate are marginalized and kept in poverty. Finally, as
microfinance strives to increase its scope and the size of its loans, it must move away from
solely untraditional loan guarantees such as joint liability, and incorporate traditional
enforcement structures that fall under the domain of the government and other legal and
financial institutions. If this enforcement fails, “relationship lending dominates and
intermediaries do not look to a broader potential base of borrowers. Under such
circumstances, banks lend to favored customers, but not to the broader public”22, which limits
the scope of microfinance institutions and cripples their ability to reach the poorest poor. This
in turn defeats the social and developmental goals of micro-credit or microfinance expansion.
The failure to collect will also exponentially affect the social responsibilities of microfinance,
because as more people default on their loans, fewer people will be able to acquire loans, and
microfinance institutions will be able to take fewer risks. The microfinance institution, as it
21

Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005. (276).
22
Ibid (277-8)

14

tries to become a larger, more influential entity, will instead be reduced to functioning as a
commercial bank, either unwilling or unable to help those that need it most.
Therefore, micro-credit may be able to function, in a basic sense, without formal
support, and can contribute to good governance practices. However, in order to grow, there
needs to be a solid governmental environment, including macroeconomic stability, financial
regulation, and effective enforcement structures.

IV: Microfinance Governance Generally
Like any other financial institution, microfinance efficacy is directly related to its
management and self-governance. To ensure good microfinance governance is to first
institute transparency and accountability, because “the operational and financial sustainability
of a microfinance institution requires, among other things, a clear strategic vision and an
organizational structure that is transparent, efficient and accepted by all the stakeholders
involved”23. In addition to sustainability, “…provid[ing] greater transparency and becom[ing]
more efficient in their operations…would be beneficial to donors, the institutions, and
borrowers” involved in the micro-credit sector24. These characteristics, while apparently selfevident, are often lacking in this fledging industry, and simple changes could easily ensure
sound business practices; for example, opening up financial statement or ‘balance sheets’ to
their investors has the potential to increase investment if the balance is favorable, or elicit
help from experts who wish to protect their investment if the balance is not favorable.
Transparency and accountability are also crucial to ethically sound business practices, which
is an important consideration in financial development. Not only are the ideas ethical, but
they directly discourage theft and corruption once instituted because crime is much easier to
detect and track. Transparency and accountability are also very attractive to Western
23

Wessling, Ann. “Note from CAPAF: Improving Microfinance Governance” www.microlinks.org. 30 November 2007.
Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005. (283)

24
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investors, so institutions who can clearly communicate the soundness of the investment to
potential supporters from abroad have a greater chance of winning investors and sustaining
and expanding their business. Therefore transparency and accountability increase domestic
and foreign involvement, which in turn leads to an increased chance of sustainability.
However, in such a rapidly-changing field, sustainability cannot be the end goal, or the
institution will be left behind. A pioneering survey carried out by the Centre for the Study of
Financial Innovation, an independent not-for-profit think tank based in London which
explores the future of financial services, called ‘Banana Skins’, had over 300 respondents
from 74 countries “and is the most comprehensive survey undertaken of the risk outlook for
microfinance”25. It concluded that the ever-increasing amount of investment into the microcredit sector “could overwhelm those microfinance institutions that are not equipped to meet
the pressures of rapid growth and rising competition. The high expectations that people have
of microfinance both as a social movement and a financial investment could be disappointed
as a result, says a new survey of the risks facing the industry”26. Interpretation of the survey
concludes that “‘the most urgent need facing the industry’, said Xavier Reille of CGAP…‘is
the need to strengthen institutions at the local level - management, boards as well as
government regulators’”27. Increasing market importance will demand a level of governance
equal to a commercial bank or other financial entity and the “increased competition will
oblige providers to apply the product development and marketing strategies of a mature
industry”. Industry development, once “development led” (from the North) will be taken over
by commercial initiatives, increasingly coming from inside the developing world28.
Fortunately for the industry and its clients, the future of micro-credit is clearly in the
hands of the micro-credit institutions themselves. To start with,
25

Barr, Michael S. “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law. Volume 26:271, 05
March 2005. (283)
26
Thomas, Jeanette. “Management weakness is the greatest risk facing microfinance, says new 'Banana Skins' survey”
www.cgap.org 14 November 2009.
27
Ibid
28
Triodos Facet/MicroNed. “Trends in Microfinance 2010-2015”. www.triodosfacet.nl. May 2009. (6)
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The technologies to transform microfinance already exist. Among the available
technologies are magnetic stripe and chip (smart) cards, point of sale devices, ATMs, cell
phones, satellite communications, the internet, credit scoring, biometric recognition and
more. These technologies will require microfinance institutions to redesign their business
models and educate their employees and customers to master new ways to deliver and
receive services. Such changes will not always be easy, but the benefits will be dramatic29.

Implementation of existing technology would be the first step to increasing the viability of
current microfinance firms in the future of the industry. This step requires little to no outside
assistance, and can begin immediately, two characteristics that put the decision squarely in the
hands of the firms themselves.
Furthermore, according to the Banana Skins survey, “of the 29 risks - or ‘Banana
Skins’ – identified…many of the top ones are linked to factors directly under MFIs' own
control, such as the quality of management and corporate governance, rising costs, staffing,
managing technology, and credit risk”: management weakness and corporate governance top
the list30. A reality in Central Africa is that “a large number of MFIs do not dispose of
reliable management and information systems. The members, staff and clients of MFIs do not
always have all necessary management skills”31. Improvements in management training and
governance structures, while not as easily implemented as utilizing existing technology, are
equally in the hands of the firms themselves and are not restricted by outside governance in
any way.

29

Ibid, (8)
Thomas, Jeanette. “Management weakness is the greatest risk facing microfinance, says new 'Banana Skins' survey”
www.cgap.org 14 November 2009.
31
“Recommendation for the Improvement and the Diligent Enforcement of the Institutional and Regulatory Framework for
Microfinance in Central African Countries”. International Law Development Association. Yaounde, 2007. (Fact Eight)
30
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CHAPTER TWO: MICROFINANCE MARKET IN CAMEROON

I: History of Microfinance in Cameroon
The history of microfinance in Cameroon can be divided roughly into three time
periods: creation, crisis, and reconstruction. The first period, creation, began with the first
microfinance institutions in Cameroon. The first microfinance firm was established in the
Anglophone zone of Cameroon in 1963 in Njinikom. The movement spread to other areas of
the region, and lead to the creation of the CAMCCUL network in 1968. In 1971,
microfinance began in the Francophone region, in Yaoundé, and two years later, a law was
instituted that allowed cooperatives within Cameroon’s borders, facilitating the creation of
microfinance institutions and associations.
The second period, crisis, was prompted by the Africa-wide financial collapse of the
1980’s. The crisis prompted a new savings strategy and, with that new strategy, an increased
autonomy of the cooperatives. The law of 1992 placed the responsibility of the management
of cooperatives on the members themselves, and mandated an internal supervisory organ
within all microfinance institutions in Cameroon.
The third and last period, reconstruction, began with a law in 1998 that revised the law
of 1992 to transfer control of microfinance firms to the Ministry of Finance instead of the
Ministry of Agriculture, allow microfinance institutions to give services to non-members, and
gave the Monetary Authority the ability to dissolve microfinance institutions. Currently,
investors are more and more demanding regarding financial accountability and transparency,
and internal control has acquired the utmost importance32.

32

The entirety of this section, excepting the labels “creation, crisis, and reconstutction”, was based on : Zangue, Edouard.
“Contribution du Contrôle Interne a la Performance Economique et Sociale des Etablissements de Microfinance au
Cameroun: thèse pour le Doctorat en Sciences de Gestion”. University of Yaoundé II, July 2009. (6)
*Original Quote : “Nous devons d’abord insister sur la bonne gouvernance. Il faut que les instances de régulation fassent
leur travail”
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II: Current Rules and Regulations
The more recent financial crisis of 2007 demonstrated the dependence of all financial
institutions on the government to prevent such occurrences and ensure stability. Isaac Ngoum,
the head of a microfinance institution in Cameroon stated that [microfinance institutions]
must first insist on good governance. The regulations must do their job*33. In Cameroon, the
main regulations governing microfinance activities were written by the Banking Commission
for Central African States (COBAC) and therefore govern all of the countries under the
Economic and Monetary Community for Central Africa (CEMAC). The stated purpose of the
these regulations is that: “…the evolution and growth of microfinance structures in the
Central African sub-region…require the setting up of a framework to regulate the activities of
microfinance structures in order to secure saving and enable the financing of basic economic
initiatives”34. The two main governing bodies are the Monetary Authority of each state,
meaning the Ministry of Finance in Cameroon, and COBAC. However, “COBAC shall only
be able to give its opinion after consultation with the Monetary Authority…any refusal to
grant licence shall be motivated and notified to the applicant by the Monetary Authority”, so
the “absolute” monetary authority in Cameroon is the Ministry of Finance35. To apply, there
must be a promoter or manager in place, as well as a general assembly or a list of members36.
A certain amount of minimum capital, depending on the category of microfinance institution,
must be already raised, and an institution file must be created and submitted37. This file,
which will be passed on from the Monetary Authority to COBAC, must include the following
documents:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•

a stamped application specifying the requested category
a registration Certificate
the minutes of the general meeting for the creation of the institution,
the Articles of Association of the Institution
a list of founding members or shareholders
the members of the Board of Directors or of the organ considered as such
where necessary, documents testifying that payments have been made in connection
with the liberation of subscribed shares, supported by bank statements or any other
documents serving as such
a three year forecast of the activity, expansion and organization
a detail of technical and financial means to be used as well as any element likely to
enlighten the competent authorities38.

When questioned on the conditions of rejection, individuals responded that not
meeting any of the requirements was a condition for rejection, including any of the workers
having been in prison, not having minimum capital, or the managers not meeting the
intellectual requirements39. When asked how many applications are rejected versus how
many are accepted, he responded some are rejected some are accepted; he didn’t have the
exact numbers.
The Banking Commission also has regulations governing the financial environment in
which the microfinance institutions operate, or “the regulations relating to the financial
balance of institutions and more generally, those relating to the sustainability of the
Microfinance sector”40. Specifically,
It shall define the regulations relating to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the conditions for resorting to borrowings
the conditions for taking shares in such institutions
the management norms that the institutions are bound to comply with in order to
guarantee their liquidity, their solvency, and the balance of their financial situation,
the accounting plan
the consolidation of accounts
and the publishing of accounting documents as well as any other information needed
by the competent authorities and the public,
the conditions under which these institutions can buy shares and grant loans to their
members, shareholders, directors, and staff
the notion of locality with regard to the drawing of cheques,
the limits applying to institutions with regard to secondary transactions
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•
•

the minimum number of members and the maximum of shares to be held by one
member in a First Category institution
the modifications of the legal status41.

The Banking Commission also, for those institutions organized into networks, controls
the umbrella organ, and the umbrella organ must file an annual report for its network42. In
addition, the Banking Commission can “carry out on-the-spot controls in affiliated
institutions”43.
Ministry of Finance supervision also continues after creation. The State demands a
prudential ratio of loans to savings, and one person cannot hold more than 15% of shares in
any one Category I institution44. However, the government does not exercise interest rate
controls on microfinance institutions, only on commercial banks, allowing microfinance more
flexibility when adjusting to default rates or poor macroeconomic markets45. Additionally,
microfinance clients or members who aren’t content with services come to Ministry of
Finance to complain46. It is worthy to note that there are people complaining about
microfinance, but the Ministry of Finance is not incredibly accessible. Visiting hours, for
example, start at noon and end at five, leaving clients who have businesses or those who have
children in a difficult position. But, if enough complaints are logged or the microfinance
institution is found to be operating unsatisfactorily, the Banking Commission has the power to
appoint a “temporal administrator”, and, if the degree of inefficiency warrants it, the
commission also has the power to liquidate the institution47. In the words of a Ministry
official: we have the power to grant your existence; we have the power to take away that
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existence48. In general, it is very difficult to follow the rules and regulations of the Ministry
of Finance and COBAC because they are difficult to read and interpret49. This can certainly
pose a problem when the state both creates the difficult rules and reserves the right to
liquidate if the rules are not followed.

III: Structure of Microfinance Sector in Cameroon
Within Cameroon, microfinance firms are either divided into networks or operate
individually. The networked institutions, like MC2s and MUFFAs, tend to have more of a
social-mission focus, and, as will be examined later, have many operational and financial
advantages over those microfinance institutions that operate individually. Those that do
choose to operate outside a network tend to be more project- and profit-oriented; an example
is ACEP-Cameroon. They have the ability to fund projects nationally and internationally.

IV: Categories of Microfinance Institutions in Cameroon
Under the Monetary Authority, microfinance institutions are divided into three
categories. Category one firms are associations, meaning they provide savings, loans, and
non-financial services only for their members. MC2s are category one firms, also known as
cooperatives. Category two firms are sociétés anonymes, meaning they offer savings and
loans to the general public. Unity Cooperative Society (UNICS) recently changed from a
category one to a category two. Category three firms do not offer any savings, only loans50.
In general, category two firms are considered the riskiest, and therefore must also apply to the
National Credit Council in addition to the Ministry of Finance and COBAC. An institution
must apply to a specific category.
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V: Organization of the MC2 Network
The Appropriate Development for Africa Foundation (ADAF) is a non-governmental
organization formed in 1992 to, firstly, bring direction to microfinance structures in
Cameroon, and, secondly, to support rural development in Cameroon51. The underlying goal
is to give the people the power to take care of themselves and develop their own world52.
Under the oversight of ADAF, there are, among other projects, two networks of microfinance
firms: MC2s or the rural micro-banks, and MUFFAs or the urban microfinance firms uniquely
for women. MC2s get their name from the formula: “Victory over Poverty (VP) can be
achieved provided that the Means (M) and Competences (C) of the Community (C) are
pooled together (VP = M x C x C = MC2)”, with “the main mission of the MC2 model
[being] to provide local populations with a development tool that will help them achieve selfreliance both at individual and community levels”53. MC2s follow a very specific, five-state
development process. Stage One is sensitization of the poor, including the importance of
savings in development, emphasis on self-reliance and a pride in self-sufficiency. State Two
is a mobilization of general savings and investments to begin the financial institution, Stage
Three is financing individual, income-generating activities, and Stage Four is financing group
activities. Stage Five, the last stage, is the implementation of social development projects in
addition to the financial and economic development instigated by the micro-credit activities54.
This process is to work towards their two-fold objective: “an economic objective: economic
and financial sustainability [and] a social objective: targeting the poor, micro, and small-scale
activities”55. MC2s offer financial and non-financial services, including “savings, loans,
money transfers, other banking facilities, micro insurance…support and consultation services,
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training, acquisition of various inputs, etc.”56 The number of members and clients using these
services in the entire MC2 network in 2007 was 849,030, a leap forward from 2000 when
members and clients numbered just 219,410, and, in total, the MC2 network has allocated
loans for more than 30 billion FCFA since 199257. The MC2s are clearly rooted in the
communities: in fact, the MC2s were instituted for the populations of a given community, at
the time by those who live there or grew up in there and live elsewhere, who put their
financial means and know-how together in order to solve the issue of the community
development*58.
It is important to note that ADAF does not strictly manage MC2s in the sense that it is
not concerned with their day-to-day affairs. The three staff members of MC2s (secretarytreasurer, accountant, and cashier) take care of the actual operation of the facility. Even when
there is an internal problem, MC2s have a Council of Elders that will mitigate conflicts, apply
social pressure to defaulters, and assist with other problems encountered in day-to-day
activities. What ADAF helps oversee is the formation of employees, compliance with rules
and regulation of the Ministry of Finance and COBAC, and adherence to the complex
accounting norms set forth by the same regulatory agents. The most important concepts of
training MC2 workers are that, ultimately, the cooperative is their own; managers must have
the appropriate skills and good management habits; the loan-to-savings ratio determines the
amount of money an MC2 can give out at once; to limit conflict of interest, Board of
Directors, staff, and the Wise Council cannot have more that 30% of net equity fund; there
will be consequences to violating any ratio set forth by the state59. The largest monitoring
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effort put forth by ADAF is watching the liquidity of each back. If there are not enough
funds, the community experiences a panic, there is a bank run, and the bank must close. This
results in a loss of confidence in that particular MC2, MC2s in general, and, in most cases, a
loss of confidence in all financial institutions, defeating the social mission of all MC2s and
microfinance60.
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CHAPTER 3: INFLUENCE OF STATE ACTIONS AND
REGULATION ON MICROFINANCE FIRMS
I: Strengths
There are several aspects of governance in Cameroon that contribute to the overall
health of the microfinance sector, including the general acceptance of the microfinance
industry as a tool in the fight against poverty. The opinion of the state is that microfinance is
a vehicle to fight poverty and to ‘bankilize’ the poor, or to provide access to financial services
and increase general savings rates61. Microfinance is closer to the poor than the state is, so
microfinance institutions are better suited to provide financial services and execute other
development efforts62. In Cameroon, a director of a microfinance institution phrases it well,
saying that microfinance institutions are an indisputable lever to economic development and
the fight against poverty*63. The main basis for this claim as an “indisputable lever” is the
unique access microfinance has to the poor. Individuals in poverty, according to COBAC,
have “unsatisfied banking and financial needs” that microfinance firms are able to fill. As a
result, these previously impoverished clients can, through microfinance, “secure saving and
enable the financing of basic economic initiatives”64. Since there is very little profit that is
available in lending to the very poor, commercial entities have little motivation. By contrast,
socially-motivated institutions like microfinance firms are ideally compelled not by profit but
by development goals, and therefore are more willing and able to take on high-risk loans.
These loans translate into “higher household incomes, increase[d] savings rates, smooth
consumption pattern and… [diverse] sources of income generation” which all contribute to
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more economically sound practices and an increased ability to contribute to economic
development within a country. Additionally, microfinance has been proven to empower its
clients, and “empowerment is at the center of human progress”65. Microfinance clients and
their families have improved health, including better nutrition and higher immunization rates;
more participation in education; and increased gender equality, including “increased
confidence and assertiveness, and increased participation in household and community
decision-making”66.
The second strength is the attempt at regulation represented by the COBAC
regulations, created partially in reaction to the surge of microfinance institutions. According
to James Beighle, Associate Director at the Peace Corps in Cameroon, “one of the biggest
issues with microfinance is that…there are all these international donor organizations that are
pumping money into it, and so everybody wants a piece of that…so the COBAC
regulations…were written to prevent some of these organizations from coming in a stealing
people’s money”67. The COBAC regulations, including the demand for a minimum amount
of capital, aim to eliminate these profit-seeking entities. Without minimum capital, the sheer
volume of enterprises looking to get a piece of the foreign development aid “could overwhelm
the supervisory authority, create moral hazard for m[icro]f[inance] i[nstitution]s not yet ready
to face the discipline of the market, and present a[n] …opportunity for undercapitalized
financial institutions searching for a way around more rigorous prudential standards and
supervision applied to banks”68. Category one firms, in lieu of minimum capital, are required
to set up a solidarity fund to cover deficits accumulated during the fiscal year69. This fund
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functions in a cooperative the same way that minimum capital does in an enterprise: it
demands previous investment by members into the institution and insures the ability of the
firm to cover certain operating costs from the beginning.
The acknowledgement of the importance of microfinance and the regulation of entry
into the sector are important beginning steps to fostering a positive operating environment.

II: Obstacles
The Cameroonian government creates or fails to address several key obstacles. The
first major obstacle is the application process. The application process can sometimes take
too long or become too convoluted for a microfinance firm to maintain momentum, and the
desire and capacity for development disappears70. In an independent seminar concerning
microfinance in CEMAC, a document was published calling for specific clarifications of the
COBAC regulations. This treatise, signed by the National Association of Microfinance
Institutions in Cameroon (ANEMCAM), included examples such as
the understanding of the phrase ‘complete application’ is made difficult by the last point on
the list of documents to present (article 23, line 3, in fine) for it does not give a precise
definition of the terms ‘financial and technical resources’; Such is the case with the
interpolated clause ‘every element likely to enlighten the competent authorities’ gives to the
monetary authority a discretionary power of appreciation71

Additionally, “the MFI promoters are not sufficiently informed about the
licensing procedure and are unaware of ways to appeal for reconsideration”72. With
unclear application procedures, microfinance institutions could be getting rejected on
technicalities rather than on the true merit of their proposals.
It is also clear that the development of new markets for microfinance is going to
require guidance and a vision, and that development particularly at “bottom of that pyramid
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will continue to require support…to bring new clients on the radar screen… [and] to pilot new
processes and products”73. The demand side, meaning increasing the number of microfinance
clients and the knowledge of those clients, is a key factor in the future of microfinance74.
Education, in fact, was cited as a specific limiting factor of microfinance development and
MC2 efforts. The problem is two-fold: one, the general comprehension by the community of
financial services and the role of banks is not conducive to the introduction of these financial
resources into the community; and two, in certain areas, the population does not understand
that its they, themselves, that must develop their own community*75. Both of these facets of
education could be undertaken by the microfinance firms themselves, like those that ADAF
runs for the MC2 network, or they could be undertaken by the state in a country-wide effort to
encourage effective participation in microfinance development efforts. The problem,
therefore, is not a lack of ability to educate, but a lack of a clear division of responsibility or a
lack of communication between the state and the microfinance sector on who is responsible
for which aspects of the sector. The solution to this problem then lies in either creating a clear
division of responsibilities, perhaps in a written document to be agreed upon by all
microfinance institutions when they are officially chartered by the state, or in opening an
official channel of communication between the microfinance institutions in Cameroon and the
state on issues such as this to which responsibilities fall on whom.
There are also obstacles cited by ADAF that are clearly within the realm of state
governance. One obstacle is infrastructure, both physical and technological. MC2s are in
rural areas because that is where the most need lies, and oftentimes one MC2 serves a large
area; in the Extreme North, for example, there are clients that are a three-hour motorcycle ride
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away from the MC276. This is not entirely a function of the distance however77. The roads are
in such bad shape that a 90 kilometer stretch can take over 6 hours78. This is not conducive to
anything but the most basis financial interactions, such as deposits or withdrawals, and limits
the ability of the MC2 to effectively institute community outreach activities or formation
activities. Even if the MC2 offered weekly financial management courses, for example, three
hours by moto over bad roads is a strong deterrent to participation. Roads also affect the
ability for microfinance clients to generate revenue to pay back their loans. Without the
ability to send goods to market or to get to their fields, the borrowers are unable to sell their
goods and unable to pay back loans, crippling rural microfinance efforts.
Consistent access to electricity is also a very important issue in the creation and
continuation of microfinance services. Cameroon, after the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, has the largest potential for electrical power, but the power supply is frequently cut
without notice to conserve energy for the week or month ahead. This not only interrupts daily
business activities and access to information, but Pierre Tchomobe adds that there are
seminars planned with practitioners and academics coming in from all over the country, and
the entire plan for a day or a weekend is unaccomplished because there is no power for
presentation tools, laptops, or lights79. With workers unable to meet, share experiences, and
improve on existing practices, there is no investment in human capital, leading to an overall
stagnation of knowledge in the field.
Technologically, the limited supply of information technology is a hugely damaging80.
Any financial institution requires exact data entry and tracking abilities, and microfinance
especially so. With short-term loans being one of the largest offerings of microfinance
institutions, there is even more data to collect within a short time period, and with savings and
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loans representing large portions of clients’ wealth, losing track of assets becomes
proportionally catastrophic. Without computers, this information is all kept on paper and all
calculations are done by hand. This obviously increases the chance for human error and adds
unnecessary risk: physical material is much more easily lost or damaged than computerized
information. Additionally, inconsistent Internet access limits the ability of MC2s to take full
advantage of the strengths of a network81. As of now, it is difficult to ensure transfer of funds
from MC2 to MC2, because there is no way to send the money, nor any way of confirming the
receipt of funds, and well as making communication difficult.

This limits the ability of the

MC2s to expand and strengthen their network. Meanwhile, attached to the Chad-Cameroon
Pipeline, there is the technology that would allow widespread Internet access for Cameroon82,
but the government has not made the proper infrastructure investments. The lack of access to
technology and Internet falls squarely in the hands of the government and their inability or
unwillingness to secure existing technology for its businesses.
Finally, corruption is an issue cited by almost everyone questioned about microfinance
and governance. With officials demanding bribes to accept microfinance applications,
widespread theft, and general mistrust of government workers, it is not only difficult to have
successful microfinance, but it is nearly impossible to build the necessary communication
channels and partnerships to take microfinance to the next level. Microfinance firms should
not have to account for bribes in their budgets and minimum capitals.

III: Recommendations
While the idea of regulation is a strength, the actual rules are difficult to read and
interpret. Therefore a first step for the Cameroonian government would be to either simplify
the regulations or publish a summary text to be used universally by all microfinance
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institutions, distribute this text, and offer annual seminars on the implications of each
regulation and restriction. This would also offer an opportunity for self-examination and
revision, and a forum to hear problems with the laws from those that are most affected. There
is also a difficulty in the state possessing both room to interpret the regulations and the ability
to liquidate firms. This dual power allows little room for error in microfinance. While
exactitude and regulation is a positive aspect of governance, arbitrary decisions and unclear
laws are problematic, especially combined with the power to liquidate firms that do not abide
by those regulations. Perhaps ANEMCAM having to approve all liquidations would be an
effective countermeasure.
To address other problems they see as severe, ADAF suggests three actions for the
government to take: address problems inherent in the judicial system, increase educational
and formational efforts, and support to microfinance institutions giving longer-term loans.
The judicial system as it stands allows debtors to bribe officials to avoid punishment, and
creates a culture where individuals apply for microfinance loans with no intention of paying
the loans back. Allowing better enforcement efforts would directly impact default rates and
MC2 profits. Better educational efforts, as already addressed, would both decrease default
rates and increase the number of individuals able to effectively use microfinance services.
Support of longer-term loans directly addresses a government critique of microfinance
institutions: they are ill-equipped to address the needs of farmers who are beginning an
enterprise, severely limiting the reach of microfinance as far as agriculture is concerned83. A
rubber plantation, for example, takes four years to produce a profit, and, currently,
microfinance institutions are not able to handle loans of that magnitude for that extended
period of time. ADAF suggests the state work in conjunction with ANEMCAM to underwrite
part of these higher-risk, longer-termed loans.
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This last point is indicative of a larger problem that exists between state governance
and microfinance institutions. This problem has two main aspects: one is the ‘blame game’
that is played, and another is the potential for over-reliance. The Sous-Directeur of
Microfinance explicitly mentioned the inability of microfinance institutions to lend in the
long-term as a weakness of the industry and a problem that needs to be solved, but ADAF
believes that it is the government’s responsibility to help support the viability these loans.
Combined with the example of demand-side education, a pattern emerges: the government
and microfinance sector often agree on the problems that exist, but then neither one does
anything about the problem and instead claims that it is the responsibility of the other actor to
come up with a solution. The ‘blame game’ leads to a stagnation of development efforts of
the industry itself, and fosters animosity between the two actors, excluding the possibility for
cooperation between two of the most important performers in economic development.
The second aspect of the problem is over-reliance or over-confidence in the industry as
a whole. It is clear that microfinance relies on good governance practices to flourish, and that
the government acknowledges the importance of microfinance in the fight against poverty.
However, in its eagerness to support the new industry, the government seems to shelve its
share of economic development responsibility. During the interview with the Sous-Directeur
of Microfinance, the emphasis was placed on the development of the microfinance sector
almost as a replacement to any Ministry of Finance efforts in the same area. Microfinance
cannot and should not take the place of government efforts at development. Without
infrastructure, education (general education of the population, such as literacy efforts, is
without dispute the domain of state governance), macroeconomic stability, and a clear vision
for the general development of a country, microfinance simply empowers individuals into a
weak environment in which true success is impossible. Therefore, a danger of the near future
could be an over-abundance of faith in the microfinance industry and a laissez-faire approach
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to the macroeconomic environment, which is a recipe for frustration and for brain-drain of
qualified, empowered individuals to better environments. The seemingly paradoxical
combination of over-reliance and laying blame is an indicator of the looming dead-lock in
microfinance: the government acknowledges the potential of microfinance, but thinks that by
that acknowledgement it has no remaining economic development responsibilities. In reality,
assuring access to financial services by the poorest parts of the population… requires
“preparatory action”…teaching skills or helping poor people to generate an initial capital to
set up an economic activity and to “appear” on the radar screen of MFIs. Even more basic is
fundamental support to assure access to basic education, health and a decent place to live,
pre-conditions to graduate poor people out of (extreme) poverty.84

The government should not and cannot let microfinance be the only vehicle in the fight
against poverty. If this stays the unofficial attitude, microfinance will stagnate and eventually
disappear, leaving the embittered poor with one more failed development attempt behind
them. The government must take serious steps to tackle the basic problems of absolute
poverty by addressing the basic needs of its population in addition to contributing to
microfinance efficacy by incorporating microfinance principles into school curriculum,
refining the application procedure, and build a comprehensive, clearly defined partnership
with the microfinance industry. Only by this dual action and a true fulfilment of their
responsibilities to its citizens can Cameroon be truly accomplishing meaningful, sustainable
development.
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CHAPTER FOUR: EFFECT OF STRUCTURE AND
ORGANIZATION OF MICROFINANCE FIRMS ON THEIR
PERFORMANCE
I: Strengths
The first strength of MC2s is that they are community owned and implemented,
meaning they place themselves where there is true need, and are few other options for savings
and loans. The pride that comes with this self-ownership is another form of empowerment of
the community, an important aspect of development. Additionally, because of their close
relationship with Afriland First Bank, people are reassured as to their credibility,
sustainability, and efficacy. The partnership with Afriland also gives co-financing or refinancing of loans and insured savings up to a certain amount, increasing the financial
viability of the MC2s85.
Theoretically, the idea of organizing microfinance firms into a network is very
attractive. Forming a network gives an opportunity to share limited resources, collaborate
without competition, and hear from experienced practitioners. Five years ago, the MC2s
created a network among themselves which has since helped with many aspects of their social
and financial missions. The network can function as a supervisor, helping identify problems
or weaknesses in individual MC2s and negotiating group rates on external auditors to assure
compliance with accounting norms. It also can buy goods in bulk, such as fertilizer or seed,
to aid projects that are happening around the country, and can sell those goods at a reduced
price. The headquarters also provides reserves for the bank, meaning each MC2 has access to
loans if they are in dire financial straits. These loans can help solve liquidity problems or
misbalanced ratios, and the bank pays back the loan at below-market-rate interest86.
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Collaborations like this have the potential to greatly reduce operating costs, hence allowing
MC2s to funnel more capital into financial and social development projects.
Linked to the creation of these networks, “it is generally recognized that the
development of structures at meso level (credit bureaus, training centres and consultancy
services, micro finance associations, local wholesalers) has contributed a lot to a sound
development of the M[icro]F[inance] industry. They provide services that make it easier for
M[icro]F[inance]I[nstitution]s to manage their risks and that allow to concentrate on their
core business”87. ADAF fits this definition perfectly. They provide training services,
financial audits, and other overseeing functions to allow MC2s to concentrate on their
financial services rather than on logistics and technicalities. In fact, a belief held at ADAF is
that MC2s do not have the capacity to completely manage themselves, which why ADAF
provides the services it does.
However, ADAF does not manage MC2s in their day-to-day activities but rather
assures compliance with regulations and prudential norms. To manage the minutiae of 76
microfinance firms under one management organization would be too much, and ADAF
would not be able to implement any other projects. The MC2s have their own management
structure put in place, made up of an Administrative Council, the Executive Secretariat, and
the Council of Elders. The Administrative Council is synonymous to a Board of Directors,
and hence handles the macro-management of the micro-bank. These positions are elected at
the first meeting of the General Assembly88. The Executive Secretariat is comprised of the
Secretary-Treasurer, the Accountant, and the Cashier, who work at the MC2s and therefore are
occupied with the daily functions and smooth running of the MC2; these positions are hired
with consultation from Afriland First Bank89. The Council of Elders, a defining characteristic
of the MC2, is comprised of members of the community who hold social or traditional power;
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there are no more than 14 members. The council wields significant power in the West and
North where often traditional authorities, like Bamileke chiefs and Muslim lamidats, hold
influential positions on the council and in the community. If individuals default on their
loans, Council of Elders can exert powerful social pressure, including exiling people from the
community or forbidding them to bury their family in village grounds. In certain cases, the
Council of Elders can also correct corrupt decisions passed down by the judicial system by
acting not on the decision of the court but on their own judgement. For example, if someone
secures a cancellation of debt by bribing an official, the Council of Elders can still act as
though that debt was not forgiven and take social action. Additionally, the Council saves
money because there is little need to go through the judicial system when social pressure
works so effectively90.

II: Obstacles
Specific to MC2s, there are governance issues at all levels of management: the Board
of Directors, the Executive Secretariat, and the Council of Elders. A governance obstacle that
starts from the very beginning is the endowment of the community elites with privileges that
can create conflicts of interest later. Because MC2s do not receive any outside funding from
the government and they want the banks to be community-owned, when the community wants
to create an MC2, they call on the Elites to produce the initial capital investment. The Elites
of each village are those who have had some measure of economic success either within the
village or outside, and are therefore expected to give back to the community and aid its
development. The Elite fund the initial capital required to create the MC2, are given shares in
the cooperative, and are frequently elected to the Board of Directors. Additionally, to begin
the flow of capital, they take out the first loans. These are usually large loans, and for the
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beginning months, the interest on these loans constitutes the majority of the banks revenue
potential. However, for one reason or another, these loans are rarely paid back, so that
potential is unrealized. Plus, the enforcement of repayment is made more complicated by the
fact that the Board is made up primarily of Elites themselves, who have very little interest in
enforcing payment on loans that they hold91. Therefore, one of the primary functions of the
Board of Directors is undermined from the very beginning of the creation process.
Further problems have been encountered with the Board of Directors. Because the
COBAC regulations limit the amount of shares that can be held by any one person and the
total that can be held by the management councils, often Presidents or Members of the Board
will use corrupt means to secure funds from the MC2s. For example, the President will get his
friend to take out a loan in that friends name with the express intention of giving the money to
the President. The friend will be under the impression that it is the President’s responsibility,
but the President cannot pay it back because the loan is not under his name, an intentional
maneuver by the President92. The microfinance institution then has the triple-problem of
having the President using the institution for personal funds, the President indirectly owning
more than his legal share of the institution, and the institution never getting the loan paid back
because the original applicant does not have the funds or refuses to pay back a loan he never
benefited from.
Furthermore, there are examples of Presidents not living in town in which the MC2 is
based. This severely limits the capacity of the Board of Directors or other management
structures to implement changes or react to immediate problems. Also, the President must be
present at General Assembly meetings, where members meet to grant loans. If the President
is not present for months at a time, there cannot be loans granted, and there cannot be any
profit-generating activity, let alone poverty alleviation. An MC2 worker elaborates:
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I think not having them [General Assembly meetings] creates a lack of trust in town, and a
lack of understanding of the MC2s services and operations. To me, it further reinforces the
idea that the MC2 is like any for-profit entity. The lack of GA meetings reduces
transparency, and the chance for people to give their ideas or feedback. They might as well
join a for-profit bank where at least the services surpass those we offer at the MC2. (Credit
for Sahel, for example, is the local competition…Credit du Sahel is more for-profit, but has
correspondingly better services, and is where I keep my personal account!)

Lack of trust or understanding, and a lack of transparency affect the ability of the
microfinance firm to affect the people it needs to reach. As previously mentioned,
transparency has the potential to attract investors and increase faith in the institution,
increasing the amount of people who will take advantage of the offered services. Lack of
personal involvement in the institution limits emotional investment, which in turn limits
loyalty and involvement in the institution. All of these factors harm the ability of the MC2 to
retain their clients, reach new clients, and achieve their stated goals.
At the level of the Executive Secretariat, the daily work of an MC2 seems to
overwhelm the regular staff of three. This not only means that important responsibilities get
put off, like budgets and weekly reports93, but that MC2s have difficulty finding time to
perform community outreach: James Beighle states “they have a social mission…they have a
clear social mission, but they’re not really doing much with it. They need to focus on it
more”94. This is precisely the reason why the Peace Corps is slowly phasing out its
involvement with MC2s: he phrases it as:
there's nothing within that structure that says ‘let's go out into the community and
market our services and give loans to the poor’, so they don't, they just sit there and
act like a traditional bank…so there's no connection between the bank and the
community, other than the customers that come in and those customers tend to be
fairly wealthy comparatively speaking to the population at large so they're not
necessarily the target audience that Peace Corps wants95.

It takes three to five years for an MC2 to become financial viable and it takes more after that
to accumulate a large enough profit to engage in outreach projects96. Hence, MC2s move
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through a financial phase and then a social phase97. This disconnect between the economic
function and the social mission of the firm is a big problem because social missions are one of
the defining characteristics of microfinance firms. An experimental program in Njinikom,
implemented with a grant from Plan International, hired field agents for outreach work to try
and address this issue. The agents identify potential savers to participate in a group account
and, Monday through Friday, visit each participant to collect savings of at least 200 FCFA;
savings is not mandatory each day. Two times a month, the participants are able to withdraw
without charge from the account, and once a month, the bank withdraws a 4% fee from the
account. The end goal is for 60% of the fee to cover the salary of the field agents, and the
remaining 40% goes to the MC2 to help cover the costs of the program98. In this way, the
field agents would not only be providing financial services, but educating the population and
encouraging savings for community capacity building.
Unfortunately, in order for the program to break even, the Field Agent would need to
consistently have 700,000 FCFA in the group account99. Assuming every participant in the
group program saves the minimum everyday, it would take 175 individuals to initially make
700,000 FCFA, with no withdrawals the first month. That is a lot of outreach in one month,
especially in the small communities that MC2s are working with. However, with communities
who already have large groups formed, there is the potential for success, and actively
encouraging savings is an excellent first step to elevation out of poverty, but there is currently
no assessment methodology to see if indeed the MC2s are having an impact or whether they
would have a larger impact with field agents. This is a problem both in measuring current
success and determining progress in the future.
An additional problem with the staff of three is that theft is common. This illustrates
an important point, that corruption is not just offering bribes for services, but it also includes
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theft and misuse of funds. Numerous examples were cited about cashiers, accountants, and
even Presidents of the Board stealing money, and there have even been cases where ADAF
has detected entire staffs engaged in fraudulent activities. Consequently, MC2s have had
branches temporarily shut down because the whole staff has been fired100.
Concerning the Council of Elders, the combination of social pressure and management
works well in situations where there is an understanding between the financial and technical
workers and those with traditional power. Unfortunately, often there is disequilibrium in
favour of the Council of Elders. For example, at one MC2, there is the President of the Board
of Directors, mayor of the town, and a traditional chief. He refused to step down from his
post as President after his term expired, but with his compounded power and traditional status,
no one is considered his equal. In this situation, “you have culture and tradition bumping
heads with rules and regulations from this institution, so who’s going to tell him, in the
community…to go…”101 This compound power is frequently found in small villages where
there are one or two people who have moved away and become very successful and come
back to the village. There is a “tendency here [in Cameroon] to defer to ‘the big people’ in
town, even when they do not merit such confidence”102.
ADAF in general seems to want to take a hands-off approach to these governance
issues. They were candid when asked about governance issues and described their role as a
last-resort mechanism when problems get out of hand or when the problems go undetected by
the individual MC2s103. This seems neglectful. ADAF has the capacity to discover problems
otherwise undiscovered by the individual institutions, so it seems that either more frequent
monitoring should be going on, or monitoring should be built into the MC2 model.
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Finally, at a macro level, ANEMCAM is ineffective in its role of providing a counterlobby to the government and facilitating microfinance formation opportunities. Since its
inception, there have been no professional seminars or conferences organized by
ANEMCAM, and there have been no revisions to microfinance policy despite the problems
previously discussed104. Just as there are advantages to organizing microfinance firms into a
network, there are great advantages to organizing microfinance firms into a lobby. It is
crucial for the government and the microfinance firms to be able to communicate and have
fruitful discussions, and this cannot be if there is no united entity with whom the government
can engage.

III: Recommendations
To address these problems of governance in the MC2s, there are several levels of
action: individual MC2s, ADAF, and the microfinance sector generally in Cameroon. On the
level of individual microfinance firms, the first is to set up a mechanism to measure the
impact of poverty reduction efforts. This would help the evaluation of specific firms and
expose further areas of improvement. Secondly, it is necessary to create a no-tolerance
environment for theft and misdirection of funds. In this way, the social power can work
greatly to the advantage of MC2s. The Council of Elders in each town can publish a
condemnation of corruption as a direct attack against the community, for example. Also, a
revised code of ethics would also help. Right now, the Code is general to the extreme105.
While it is an important first step to institute ethics as a concern in business, the next step is to
create a culture around ethics, and citing specific violations in the code of ethics is beneficial
to deterrence and enforcement practices. Finally, MC2s should continue to look for
opportunities to expand their social mission. By involving more members of the community
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and opening up forums for discussion of helpful services to offer, there is increased
opportunity for a true social impact.
At the level of ADAF, the largest contribution that can be made is to train more people
to be able to work and contribute at MC2s. This would have a three-fold impact: increased
employment in the community, directly working towards elevating the population out of
poverty; less workload on each individual at the MC2s, increasing their efficacy and impact
and freeing their time to design social outreach projects; and less power concentrated in each
person’s hands, meaning a reduction in the possibility of theft or misdirection of funds.
Additionally, there is a possibility that this could help address the high concentration of power
among a few individuals. By involving others in the community and having a President of the
Board who is different from the mayor and the traditional chief, there could be a balance
between social culture and financial regulations.
There also must be an effort to re-evaluate the management structures of the MC2s and
address the specific issues that exist at each MC2, either case by case or by creating a
mechanism for each MC2 to do it themselves. ADAF, as an impartial observer and the
expertise in accounting and supervision, has the potential to detect and solve many more
problems than the individual MC2s have, and therefore has the increased responsibility to
fulfill these duties. They cannot expect the community to completely develop themselves, as
they have stated, without outside instruction and guidance. Without a larger vision guiding
individual efforts, those individual efforts can become redundant, misguided, or cyclical. Just
as the government must form a clear vision of development for the country, organizations
such as ADAF must form a clear vision for the development of their institutions to more
effectively support and direct the poverty alleviation efforts.
Finally, at the macro level, the microfinance institutions must organize themselves into
an effective, organized lobby to counter any obstacles posed by government regulations.
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Without equal presence in the dialogues between the government and the microfinance sector,
the government can take advantage of its power and act only in its own interest. The
microfinance firms must be able to represent themselves or there will never be a constructive
environment for microfinance to flourish. The regulations will never change without a
reason, and the government will not know what actions to take to improve the general
environment or the general operating atmosphere for microfinance without any input from the
industry. Whether this organization is a reinterpretation of ANEMCAM or there is a separate
organization set up, this lobby is necessary to the continued and future success of
microfinance.
However, there is also much for other microfinance organizations to learn from the
MC2, Afriland, and ADAF partnership. The combination of field work of the MC2s, the
technical assistance and training provided by ADAF, and the financial backing and guidance
given by Afriland allows each organization to fulfill its purpose without needlessly
concerning themselves with extraneous information or areas in which they have no expertise.
An interesting aspect to explore would be the benefits of linking other commercial banks with
microfinance institutions to see if that does in fact affect the perception of the microfinance
institution and therefore increase their efficacy. Afriland and ADAF certainly offer
advantages to MC2s and, with the implementation of an impact-evaluation mechanism, it
would be possible to see to what extent instituting these partner organizations could affect the
efficacy of other microfinance institutions.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, there are actions that can be taken by both the government and the
microfinance institutions themselves to increase the efficacy of microfinance in Cameroon.
By encouraging participation in micro-credit activities, sensitizing the target market to the
benefits and proper management of microfinance, and increasing the general health of the
operating environment for the microfinance institutions, the government can properly
augment the potential of the industry to continue to fulfill its economic and social mission.
By changing management structures, emphasizing transparency and accountability, and
increasing internal auditing and monitoring capabilities, microfinance institutions can put
management structures in place which are more conducive to larger-scale operations and
increased ability to reach the poor. But what is most important is for both sides to take a
realistic approach to the responsibilities that come with their respective duties and to work to
fulfill those responsibilities. In the end, the goal of development should take precedence over
all, and it should be understood that all recommendations in this paper have been made with
that end in mind.
It should also be considered that governance should be a value in and of itself. There
can be arguments made in favor of good governance because of efficiency and other
quantitative or qualitative criteria, but in the end good governance practices, like good
principles, should ideally be valued for their very nature. Therefore, the first problem to be
addressed, and perhaps the most difficult, is to understand why good governance is not
happening in the current environment, and create a culture around valuing good governance
for itself and not for what it can do.
Microfinance is simply a vehicle for financial and economic development; it should
not be deified or worshipped as the solution to all the world’s woes, particularly with all the
governance difficulties it is currently experiencing. It is far from being perfect, and far from
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perfectly fulfilling its potential. But, for MC2s, the smallest steps will have the largest
consequences, and addressing problems in governance is not a Band-Aid solution, it does not
treat the symptoms of microfinance or of the governmental inefficiency. Instead, it addresses
the sources. All governance changes will not only increase current efficiency, but will
exponentially increase the ability of the micro-banks to alleviate poverty. This combined with
an increased emphasis on development from the government will foster sustainable changes
in the basic economy of the country, and, hopefully, begin to encourage good governance as a
principle, and not just for the end it provides.
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